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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILBUR BURNHAl\1, CHARLES L. 
BURNHA:JI, FRANCES L. MAYO, 
KENNETH A. LUCKEY, Md 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
pANY, a corporation, as administrator 
of the estate of JENNIE B. SCHANK, 
Deceased, 
Plaifntiffs OJnd Appellants, 
vs. 
LETA B. ESCHLER, 
Defendant ~and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Case No. 
7209 
'This is an action to quiet title to nine parcels of real 
property of record in the name of Jennie B. Schank at 
the time of :Jirs. Schank's death on 11arch 30th, 1947. 
Mrs. Schank died intestate as to the real property. There-
after Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed ad-
ministrator of the estate and was joined as a plaintiff in 
this proceeding with all of the heirs of the deceased, with 
the exception of Maritta B. Brazier, the mother of the 
defendant, Leta B. Eschler. The defendant, a niece of 
the deceased, claims title to the properties by reason of 
deeds purportedly executed by Mrs. Schank in 1938 and 
placed of record on April 3rd, 1947, three days after Mrs. 
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Schank's death. The trial court sustained the defendant's 
claim of ownership and from the Findings and Decree, 
quieting title in the defendant, this appeal is taken. 
Plaintiffs, among other things, allege in their reply 
that the deeds were never delivered or intended to be 
delivered to Leta B. Eschler; that Mrs. Schank, the de-
ceased, during her lifetime never intended to nor did she 
divest herself of or surrender up the title, possession, 
or right of possession in and to the properties in ques-
tion, and that the deeds had been altered and changed as 
to the grantee and that such alterations and changes were 
not made with the consent or knowledge of Jennie B. 
Schank (Tr. ·pp. 26-28). 
, Deeds to each of the nine parcels of land described 
in the complaint were signed on the 20th day of Decem-
her, 1938 in the office of S. W. Dowse in Salt Lake City, 
who prepared the deeds for Mrs. Schank's signature in 
blank as to the grantee. After the deeds were prepared, 
signed and acknowledged with the name of the grantee 
in blank, Mrs. Schank took them from the office of Mr. 
Dowse and never returned to have them completed as to 
the name of the grantee. At the time the deeds were 
prepared Mrs. Schank stated, in effect, that she wanted 
to set some of her affairs in order and to have the deeds 
made out so that some time in the future, when she saw 
fit, she could convey the properties to an individual or 
individuals of her choice ( Tr. pp. 103-104). 
The record is silent as to when or by whom the name, 
Leta B. Eschler, was inserted as the name of the grantee 
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in each of the deeds, but a casual examination of the 
deeds discloses that the nan1e of the grantee was not 
inserted at the tirne the deeds were signed and acknowl-
edged by the grantor, corroborating in that respect the 
witness Dowse. L. R. Eschler, the husband of the defen-
dant, testified that the deeds were delivered to him in 
~larch of 19-16 at Saratoga, California, by Mrs. Schank 
who was there at the time on a visit (Tr. p. 125); that at 
the time the deeds were delivered Mrs. Schank stated 
to the witness ''that she was giving these properties to 
Leta, and that she wanted me to hold them until after 
her death. She made that express request, and that-
she stated she didn't want Leta to feel any personal obli-
gation to her while she was still living; that that was 
about the substance of it." ('Tr. p. 127). Mr. Eschler 
testified that the deeds were in an envelope, which he 
believed was sealed at the time; that after Mrs. Schank 
left and returned home, he broke the seal, opened the 
envelope and examined the deeds, finding them to be in 
the same condition, with the exception of the recording 
data, that they were in at the time of their introduction 
in evidence (Tr. pp. 137-139). 
Defendant's husband further testified that he kept 
the deeds in a brief case with other personal papers, 
and that they were constantly in his possession until 
he handed them to his wife, the defendant, in Salt Lake 
City immediately following Mrs. Schank's funeral, the 
day before the deeds were recorded, and that until the 
deeds were handed to Mrs. Eschler by the husband wit-
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ness on April 2nd, 1947, Mrs. Eschler had no knowledge 
of their existence ( Tr. pp. 128-129). 
Abstracts of Title, introduced in evidence as exhibits 
B to I inclusive, covering respectively the first eight par-
cels of land described in the complaint, dis~lose the fee 
simple title to have been in Jennie B. Schank on the date 
of her death, March 30, 1947. The ninth parcel of land 
described in the complaint and the subject matter of 
one of the deeds executed in the office of Mr. Dowse on 
December 20, 1938 and included in one of the deeds said 
to have been delivered by Mrs. Schank to the defendant's 
husband in March, 1946, was sold, and a uniform real 
estate contract entered into by Jennie B. Schank, as 
seller, and Jay R. Springer and wife, as buyers, under 
date of April 1st, 1944 (Tr. p. 72, exhibit J). 
Mrs. Schank, up to the time of her death, treated the 
properties as her own, as indicated by negotiations· with 
real est,ate agents and others concerning the possible dis-
position of some or all of the properties (Tr. pp. 265-268, 
269-270, 284-285), paid taxes on all of the properties (Tr. 
pp. 79-80), collected the rentals and income therefrom as 
shown by entries in books of account, exhibits Land M, 
made returns and paid income tax in connection there-
with (Tr. pp. 258-259), and kept the properties insured 
against loss by fire in her name (Tr. p. 2·60). 
Over objection as to the competency of the witness 
Eschler to ·testify to any transactions with the deceased 
( Tr. ·p. 125), he stated that Mrs. Schank felt that it 
would be a burden for the Eschlers to pay the taxes in 
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excess of revenues from the properties, and that she 
would pay the taxes herself for Leta; that she advised 
against selling any of the properties (Tr. pp. 127-129). 
Other testimony was to the effect that :Mrs. Schank was 
an exceptionally good, careful and meticUlous business 
woman (Tr. pp. 217-218); that ~Irs. Eschler was a fav-
orite relative (Tr. p. 146) and that there was one relative 
in particular that ~Irs. Schank did not even want on the 
property (Tr. p. 218). 
An Olographic Will was introduced in evidence, ex-
hibit P, reading as follows: 
"June 17-26 
Herein is the disposal I wish of my be1longings if 
I should meet with any casualty. 
The home and all belongings on 2nd Ave. shall be-
long to my mother during her life along with 
$10,000.00 Ten Thousand Dollars. One Thousand 
$1,000.00 to Melvin, $1,000.00 to Leta, $1,000.00 
to Mildred and $2,000.00 to my sisters, Smona' 
& Rittie, also brothers. 
Jennie B. Schank" 
Exhibit A, an undated memorandum in the hand-
writing of ~Irs. Schank, was likewise received in evi-
dence, reading as follows: 
''An eque1al division shall be made of balance 
among all rnembers of familly enclud.ing those not 
mentioned in this paper Deeds to property are 
in safe to be completed as designated by my 
rnother 
Jennie B. Schank'' 
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The exhibits P and A were found together in an 
envelope shown on the photostat exhibit P. The envelope 
was found in ·a black record book among Mrs. Schank's 
papers by the administrator while listing the assets of 
the estate (Tr. pp. 252-254). 
Mrs. Eschler arrived in Salt Lake immediately after 
Mrs. Schank's death. Her husband arrived in Salt Lake 
on a Monday prior to the funeral that was held the fol-
lowing Wednesday. On Monday night both Mr. and Mrs. 
Eschler stayed alone in Mrs. Schank's home on Second 
Avenue. In the basement of the home was a safe con-
taining private papers of Mrs. Schank. On Tuesday 
night Mr. and Mrs. Eschler stayed at the home of a 
relative and on Wednesday night, the night before the 
deeds were recorded, they again stayed alone at Mrs. 
Schank's home (Tr. p. 132). While the witness Eschler 
denied going into the safe, he admitted that while there 
he removed a page from one of Mrs. Schank's account 
books that contained information relating to personal 
transactions between himself and the deceased ( Tr. pp. 
133, 135-136). The safe, however, had been opened on 
Monday afternoon, before Mr. Eschler arrived in town, 
in the presence of Mrs. Mayo, a niece of the deceased 
and one of the heirs, Mrs. Eschler, the defendant, and 
others, who made only a superficial e~amination of the 
contents at the time (Tr. p. 281). 
From the foregoing and aside from the question 
of the credibility of the witness Eschler, the husband 
of the defendant, two basic questions present themselves, 
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( 1) whether the alleged delivery of the deeds under the 
circumstances was testamentary in nature or an absolute 
conveyance between living parties, and (2) whether, in 
·any event, the signing of the deeds in blank as to the 
grantee, and no further acknowledgment or proof as to 
execution of the completed documents, constitutes due 
execution and proof of conveyance. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON 
1. The court erred in admitting in evidence defen-
dant's exhibits numbers 1 to 9 inclusive over the objec-
tion of plaintiffs that no proper foundation had been 
laid and that said deeds were incompetent, irre~evant 
and immaterial. (Original objection Tr. p. 110. ObjeC-
tion renewed and ruling Tr. p.192). 
2. That the judgment and decree (Tr. pp. 56-57) 
is contrary to law and is not supported by the evidence, 
or by the findings or by the conclusions of law. 
3. That the conclusions of law (Tr. pp. 53-55) are 
not supported by the evidence or by the findings of fact. 
4. That the findings of fact (Tr. pp. 48-53) are not 
supported by but are contrary to the evidence and par-
ticularly as the same purport to find that Jennie B. 
Schank completed or caused to be completed the nine 
deeds by inserting or causing to be inserted therein the 
name of Leta B. Eschler as grantee, and that the said 
Jennie B. Schank intended to part with and did divest 
herself of all control and dominion over said deeds or 
the property described therein. 
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5. Finding of fact number 2 (Tr. p. 49) is not sup-
ported by but is contrary to ~aw and the ·evidence and 
particularly wherein it is found that the alleged affection 
between Jennie B. Schank and the defendant was to the 
exclusion of all other relatives of Jennie B. Schank, in-
cluding the plaintiffs. 
6. Finding of fact number 3 (Tr. p. 49) is not sup-
ported by but is contrary to law and the evidence and 
particularly wherein it purports to find that on the 20th 
day of December, 1938 Jennie B. Schank executed the 
nine warranty deeds covering and describing the parcels 
of real estate involved. 
7. Finding of fact number 4 (Tr. p. 51) is not sup-
ported by but is contrary to law and the evidence, and 
particularly wherein it purports to find that sometime 
prior to the month of March, 1946 said Jennie B. Schank 
completed, or caused to be completed, the nine deeds 
aforesaid by inserting or causing to he inserted therein 
the name of Leta B. Eschler as grantee, and wherein 
it purports to find that Jennie B. Schank delivered said 
nine deeds and each of them to Logan Russell Eschler, 
husband of the defendant, in furtherance of a purpose 
or intention, express or otherwise, to make provision for 
the defendant or otherwise. 
8. Finding of fact number 5 (Tr. p. 51) is not sup-
ported by but is contrary to law and the evidence, and 
particularly wherein it is found that Jennie B. Schank 
intended to part and did by said act of delivery com-
pletely and irrevocably divest herself of all control and 
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dominion over said deeds, and particularly wherein it is 
found that simultaneously or otherwise with the alleged 
delivery of said deeds to Logan Russell Eschler, Jennie 
B. Schank informed the said Eschler that the properties 
described in said deeds were being given by Jennie B. 
Schank to the defendant with the intention and purpose 
that defendant should have the security of the properties 
at all times or otherwise, and with the advice and recom-
mendation of Jennie B. Schank that defendant should 
retain said properties and not sell and dispose of them; 
and wherein it is found that the said Jennie B. Schank 
requested that defendant be not informed concerning the 
delivery of said deeds until after the death of Jennie B. 
Schank, and that she, Jennie B. Schank, desired to con-
tinue the payment of taxes and expenses incident to the 
management of the properties described in said deeds in 
order that the expenses incident to their operation and 
management should not be burdensome to defendant or 
her husband, Logan Russell Eschler. 
9. Finding of fact number 6 (Tr. p. 52) is contrary 
to law and the evidence, and particularly that portion 
thereof wherein it is found that after the delivery of 
said deeds Jennie B. Schank continued in the manage-
ment, control and possession of the properties described 
therein and in plaintiffs' complaint for the use and 
benefit of defendant, and wherein it is found that Jennie 
B. Schank stated to third parties that she could not sell 
or contract to sell the so-called Murray tract or any other 
property without conferring with defendant to ascertain 
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if defendant wished to hav:e the money from a sale 
thereof, or to retain said property, and that any tract 
belonged to the defendant and that the defendant had 
any control to be exerciS"ed over any of said tracts prior 
to or after the death of the said Jennie B. Schank; and 
wherein it is found that Jennie B. Schank did not request 
or demand or obtain the control or possession of the 
deeds or any of them during her lifetime, and that Logan 
Russell Eschler continued uninterruptedly in the control 
and possession of the same, and particularly where it is 
found that Logan Russell Eschler delivered said deeds 
to the defendant as requested by Jennie B. Schank. 
10. Finding of fact number 8 (Tr. p. 53) is contrary 
to law and the evidence, and particularly that portion 
thereof wherein it is found that Jennie B. Schank in her 
lifetime intended that the property and the said deeds 
should be the property of Leta B. Eschler, and wherein 
it is found that Jennie B. Schank in her lifetime deliv-ered 
said deeds to Logan Russell Eschler so that any purpose 
or intention in connection with such property would be 
carried out. 
11. Conclusion of law number 1 (Tr. pp. 53-54) is 
contrary to law and is not supported by the evidence. 
12. Conclusion of law number 2 is contrary to law 
and is not supported by the evidence. 
13. Conclusion of law number 3 is contrary to law 
and is not supported by the evidence. 
14. Conclusion of law number 4 is contrary to law 
and is not supported by the evidence. 
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15. The court erred in overruling objections as to 
the competency of the "'itness Eschler, the husband of 
the defendant, to testify as to the transactions with the 
deceased ( Tr. p. 125). 
ARGUMENT 
The Assignments of Error and the various proposi-
tions involved group themselves for argument as follows : 
1. In View Of The Showing Made In The Reoord The 
Deeds Under Which The Defendant Claims Are Void. 
Defendant's witness Dowse testified that the exhibits 
1 to 9 inclusive were prepared in his office on December 
20, 1938, signed by Jennie B. Schank and acknowledged 
by the witness' father (Tr. p. 101) with the grantee's 
name in blank (Tr. p. 104). The record is silent as to who 
inserted the name of Leta B. Eschler as grantee in the 
instruments or when the same was done or the circum-
stances, except the testimony of the defendant's husband 
to the effect that when he broke the seal and opened the 
envelope containing the deeds after the envelope had been 
handed to him by J\1:rs. Schank, the deeds bore the name 
of Leta B. Eschler. When the defendant offered the 
deeds in evidence objections were made that no founda-
tion had been laid and that the exhibits were incompetent, 
irrelavent and immaterial (Tr. p. 110, 192). 
Deeds executed in blank are void. This was the hold-
ing of this court in the case of Utah State Building & 
Loan Ass'n v. Perkims, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950. The court 
applied Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, Section 1974, the 
same as Section 33-5-1 U.C.A. 1943, Statutes of Fraud, 
which section is as follows: 
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''No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared other-
wise than by act or operation of law, or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or de-
claring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing.'' 
In applying the foregoing statute the court held: 
''I find no authority holding a conveyance ef-
fective under similar facts as appear in this rec-
ord. On the contrary, there appears to be no con-
flict that blank deeds or blank papers executed 
as these were are void and do not convey any 
interest or title whatever. Southern Pine Lumber 
Co. v. Arnold (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S.W. 917; 
Allen v. Allen, 48 Minn. 462, 51 N.W. 473; 13 Cyc. 
551; 8 R.C.L. '956.'' 
In the case of Trout v. Taylor, 17 P. (2d) 7'61 (Cal.) 
it was held: 
"In Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal. App. 540, at page 
547, 243 P. 487, 490, the court held: 'There can be 
no doubt as to the utter invalidity of the instru-
ments under which appellant's grantor, Meng, 
derainged his purported title. The blank deeds 
signed by respondent and subsequent1ly filled out 
under Neilson's direction, with Meng's name in-
serted as the purported grantee, were mere nul-
lities. According to the great weight of authority, 
a deed executed in blank is void and passes no 
title. Wunderlin v. Cadogan, 50 Cal. 613, and cases 
cited infra. As was said in Whitaker v. Miller, 83 
Ill. 381: 'There must be, in every grant, a grantor, 
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a grantee and a thing granted, and a deed wanting 
in either essential is absolutely void.' * * * 
In view of these authorities, the conclusion is in-
escapable that the deed in question was not void-
able, but was void in toto; a nullity.'' 
In Allen v. Allen, 51 N.W. 473 (Minn.), after holding 
that in every grant there must be a grantor, grantee and 
a thing granted and a deed wanting in either essential 
is invalid, the court held that parol testimony could not 
be received for the purpose of curing a defective deed, 
stating as follows: 
''If it could, an error in or omission of the name 
of the grantor or grantee, or an error in or 
omission of the description of the property in-
tended to be conveyed, could be rectified or wholly 
supplied with the same class of testimony in an 
action of this character. A legal title to real prop-
erty cannot be established by parol.'' 
This court, in the early case of Nilson v. Ramilton, 
53 Utah 594, 17 4 P. 624, held a deed to be void which ran 
to a deceased person or to his estate, the court stating: 
"We need not stop to discuss or declare that 
the attempted conveyance of 1876 to James L.· 
Hamilton, who was then deceased, or to the estate 
of James L. Hamilton, deceased, did not convey 
any title to any one. There was no person in ex-
istence in law, named in the deed, authorized to 
receive, or who had the legal capacity to receive 
the title to the premises. It must therefore be con-
cluded that these attempted conveyances of the 
several patentees in 1876 were mere nullities. 13 
Cyc. 527; Rixford v. Zeigler et al., 150 Cal. 435, 
88 Pac. 1092, 119 Am. St. Rep. 229; Mcinerney v. 
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Beck, 10 Wash. 515, 39 Pac. 130; 1 Devlin, Deeds 
(3d Ed.) S'ection 187.'' 
The validity of the deeds were in question by the 
pleadings, by the alteration on the face of the documents 
themselves, and by the testimony of the witness Dowse 
called by the defendant. The moment it was shown that 
the instruments were not as on their face they purported 
to be, the burden rested upon the defendant to prove 
their due execution. When the witness Dowse testified 
that Mrs. Schank took the deeds from his office with no 
grantee named, then every presumption of due execution 
was destroyed and a re-execution under the authorities 
was required, which would mean something more than 
the mere physical delivery of the deeds by Mrs. Schank 
to the witness Eschler, which brings us to the next point. 
2. The Defendant Failed To Sustain The Burden Of 
Due Execution Of The Deeds. 
In the case of Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 
14 P. 338, the court holds that the _proving of a deed, 
when necessary to be made, must be made in the first 
instance by the testimony of a subscribing witness, and 
that the certificate of acknowledgment is not conclusive 
but only prima facie evidence. In the case at bar the 
proof appears by the defendant's own witness that the 
deeds even as between the parties were not sufficient 
because when signed the name of the grantee was lack-
ing. Now, what proof is there that even as between the 
parties the instruments were sufficient~ The inference 
that might be said to arise from the testimony of Eschler 
is not sufficient and this is all there is in the record for 
the defendant to rely upon. 
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The term "conveyance" is defined by Section 78-1-1 
U.C.A. 1943, and is as follows: 
'·The term 'conveyance' as used in this title shall 
be construed to embrace every instrument in writ-
ing by which any real estate, or interest in real 
estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered 
or assigned, except wills, and leases f0r a term not 
exceeding one year.'' 
The manner of proof of the execution of a convey-
ance is prescribed by Section 78-2-9 U.C.A. 1943, as fol-
lows: 
''The proof of the execution of any conveyance 
whereby real estate is conveyed or may be affected 
shall be: 
(1) By the testimony of a subscribing witness, 
if there is one ; or, 
(2) When all the subscribing witnesses are dead, 
or cannot be had, by evidence of the handwriting 
of the party, and of a subscribing witness, if 
there is one, given by a credible witness to each 
signature. '' 
In the Tarpey case, supra, it is said: 
"The statute points to the subscribing witnesses 
as the first persons to look to in such cases for 
proof, and the proper ones to furnish proof in 
the first instance of the due execution of the deed, 
in all cases when it is attacked, or when its vali-
dity is in any manner called into question. Besides, 
the statute requiring one or more witnesses to a 
deed increases the difficulty of making a fraudu-
lent or forged deed, and adds to the solemnity of 
its execution. The signing of deeds by witnesses 
was not required at common law, nor was the 
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signing by the party required. But here we have 
a statute that specifies, as parts of the due execu-
tion of the deed, the signing by the party and the 
signing by the witnesses.'' 
The court, in the Tarpey case, had before it the Com-
piled Laws of Utah 1876, page 254, Section 1 (617), 
which section provides : 
''That conveyances of lands, or of any estate or 
interest therein, may be made by deed, signed by 
the person from whom the estate or interest is 
intended to pass, being of lawful age, or by his 
lawful agent or attorney, and by one or more 
credible witnesses, and acknowledged or proved, 
and recorded as provided in this act.'' 
So far as we can determine, the statute just quoted 
was not carried into our statutory law by the Revised 
Statutes of 1898 or since that time so far as it pertains 
to the requirement of the signature of "one or more 
credible witnesses", but for many years we have had 
Section 78-2-9, supra, setting forth the requirements of 
proof of the execution of a conveyance (1) by the testi-
mony of a subscribing witness if there is one, and (2) 
by the evidence of the handwriting of the party given by 
a credible witness to the signature, and section 78-2-14 
U.C.A. 1943, the material portion of which we set out in 
italics, the entire statute reading as follows: 
"No oertifioate of any such P'ro1oj shall be made 
wnless a oompefAent and credible witness shall state 
on oath or affirmation that he personally knew 
the person whos~e name is subscribed thereto as 
a party, well kwows his signatvure, statilng his 
me,ans of knowledge, 1a/YI;d believ/e'S the name of 
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the party S'LJJbscribed thereto as ,a party was sub-
scribed by such perso·n; nor unless a competent 
and credible witness shall in like manner state 
that he personally knew the person whose name 
is subscribed to such conveyance as a witness, 
well knows his signature, stating his means of 
knowledge, and believes the name subscribed there-
to as a \\itness was thereto subscribed by such 
person.'' . 
..A further requirement is provided by Section 78-2-11 
U.C.A. 1943, which provides: 
''No certificate of such proof shall be made unless 
such subscribing witness shall prove that the per-
son whose name is subscribed thereto as a party 
is the person described in, and who executed, the 
same; that such person executed the conveyance, 
and that such person subscribed his name thereto 
as a witness thereof at the request of the maker 
of such instrument.'' 
Sections 78-2-14 and 78-2-11 must be construed in 
connection with 78-2-9, which in turn must be construed 
with Section 78-1-1 defining the term "conveyance", and 
all of the sections must be reconciled and construed with 
the Statute of Frauds, Section 33-5-1, requiring the deed 
or conveyance to be in writing, subscribed by the party 
making the grant or by his lawful agent thereunto auth-
orized by writing. 
To be a conveyance within the statutes relating to 
real estate and the statute of frauds the document must 
be a complete, effective instrument, meaning all of those 
things essential to a completed, effective conveyance and 
delivery as part of the execution of the same. Words 
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atnd Phr,ases, Permanent Edition, Volume 15, page 547. 
Our statutes require a written document to be subscribed 
by the grantor or his duly authorized agent and, as here-
tofore pointed out, for the document to be effective as 
a conveyance it must be complete as to the grantor, the 
grantee and the thing conveyed. The term ''subscribed'' 
means to write one's name at the end of the instrument. 
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 40, page 
454. 
The only proof in the record as to the subscribing 
of exhibits 1 to 9 inclusive by Jennie B. Schank comes 
from. the testimony of defendant's witness Dowse who 
unequivocally stated, and it is not disputed, that when 
the instruments were signed there was no grantee named 
therein. Under those circumstances the deeds wer·e never 
entitled to recording and all presumptions of due execu-
tion of an effective conveyance fall. 
To make the deeds admissible in evidence under our 
statutes, proof would have to be made that the deeds 
were re-acknowledged after the name of the purported 
grantee had been inserted. The necessity of the acknowl-
edgement to admit the deeds in evidence was pointed out 
in the case of Murray v. Beal, 23 Utah 548, 65 P. 726, 
where the court stated: 
''The acknowledgment, while not necessarily a 
part of the deed, was a necessary ingredient in 
order to admit it of record, or to admit it in evi-
dence without further proof. It had reference 
to the proof of execution, not to the force of the 
deed itself, especially when third parties were not 
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concerned. Gray v. ffirich, 8 Kan. 112; Devl. 
Deeds, Section 464; sections 1975, 2001, Rev. St. 
1898; Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363, 73 Am. Dec. 
543.'' 
To the same effect is the Waldr.on v. Waller, 64 S.E. 
964 ( W. V a.), where the court states : 
''This is not a case like that of Philip Carey Mfg. 
Co. v. Watson, 58 W. Va. 189, 52 S.E. 515, and 
cases of that class, relied upon by plaintiff where 
an altered instrument is offered in evidence by 
a party in support of some right of action claimed 
by him under it. In such a case the material altera-
tion in the instrument deprives the holder re-
sponsible for it of any executory rights or right 
of action thereon, and destroys its evidential force 
and validity. 
* * * The authorities we think niake it clear 
that, although such alteration may have been with 
the consent of the grantors, the deed cannot op-
erate to· invest in the grantee land not covered by 
the original grant, without a re-delivery of the 
-deed by them, and; if it has been acknowledged 
before the alteration, the deed should be again 
acknowledge d.'' 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
of Waskey v. Chambers, 56 L. Ed. 885, 224 U.S. 564, 
holds: 
"It never had but one witness, two being neces-
sary to authorize the recording of a deed, and 
the only acknowledgment was before the altera: 
tion. Therefore it was filed without authority, 
was not entitled to registration, and, as we have 
said, had no effect as against the petitioner.'' 
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A similar expression comes from the Alabama court 
in the case of Hess et al., v. H o:dges, 78 So. 85 : 
''The original deed from the Mizes to the com-
plainant was also sought to be corrected; but 
whether this was done with appellee's consent 
or the consent of her agent was disputed in the 
evidence. The acknowledgment, delivery, and 
registration of the deed from Mize to complainant 
having been perfected long before the interlinea-
tion in the original deed was made, the amend-
ment of that instrument, even though made with 
the grantee's consent, had no effect or operation; 
the instrument not having been again acknowl-
edged or attested.'' 
There is only one circumstance proven in the record 
and that is, when Mrs. Schank signed the exhibits 1 to 9 
inclusive the name of the grantee was omitted. There 
is no proof of a subscribing or re-execution or re-ac-
knowledgment of the deeds at a time when, with the 
name of the grantee inserted, they would be effective 
deeds of conveyance. The instruments signed by Mrs. 
Schank in the office of Mr. Dowse were void and invalid 
for the purposes claimed by the defendant. The defen-
dant has failed to sustain the burden of proving an effec-
tive conveyance in her favor subscribed by Jennie B. 
Schank. 
In the case of In re Henry Newell's Esbat,e, 78 Utah 
463, 5 P. (2d) 230, this court approved the following 
rule: 
"11he rule is well stated in the case of Peters 
v. Lohr, supra, as follows: 'A presumption is 
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not evidence of anything, and only relates to a 
rule of law as to 'vhich party shall first go for-
ward and produce evidence sustaining a matter 
in issue. A presumption will serve as and in the 
place of evidence in favor of one party or the 
other until prima facie evidence has been adduced 
by the opposite party; but the presumption should 
never be placed in the scale to be weighed as evi-
dence. The presumption, when the opposite party 
has produced prima facie evidence, has spent its 
force and served its purpose, and the party then, 
in whose favor the presumption operated, must 
meet his opponent's prima facie evidence with 
evidence, and not presumptions. A presumption is 
not evidence of a fact, but purely a conclusion.' '' 
The Newell case is cited with approval in the case 
of SaUas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 P. (2d) 493, where 
this court again in discussing presumptions stated: 
''And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that 
as soon as evidence is offered on the question the 
presumption ceases and does not longer exist.'' 
The rule stated in the Newell case would be imme-
diately apparent had the defendant, in the first instance, 
and before the testimony of the witness Dows·e, relied 
upon the presumption of due execution afforded by the 
recording of the nine deeds and then it was shown, as by 
the witness Dowse, that when signed and purportedly 
acknowledged the deeds did not make provision for a 
grantee. Under those circumstances the presumption of 
due execution would be dissipated and the burden of 
going forward would be upon the person claiming under 
the deeds to show due execution of the completed, effec-
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tive documents. We have· here the unusual situation of 
the defendant's own proof destroying the inference or 
presumption that she would rely upon. 
Our statutes relating to proof of the execution of a 
conveyance have not been satisfied by the defendant, 
and the burden in that regard is further accentuated 
by Section 104-48-16 U.C.A. 1943, which section is as 
follows: 
''The party producing as genuine a writing which 
has been altered, or appears to have been altered 
after its execution in a part material to the ques-
tion in dispute must account for the appearance 
or alteration. He may show that the alteration 
was made by another without his concurrence, 
or was made with the consent of the parties af-
fected by it, or otherwise properly or innocent-
ly made, or that the alteration does not change 
the meaning or language of the instrument. If he 
does this, he may give the writing in evidence, but 
not otherwise.'' 
Our inspection of the deeds in question show the 
name of Leta B. Eschler not to be by the same type-
writer as the remaining portion of the instruments. This 
fact is also obvious from the testimony of the witness 
Dowse who stated that the instruments while prepared 
in his office were taken therefrom by Mrs. Schank with-
out having inserted any name for that of the grantee, 
and that the deeds were never returned to him for that 
purpose. 
W~ords am;d Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 3, 
page 293: 
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"An 'alteration' of an instrument is an act done 
upon the written instrument which, without de-
stroying its identity, changes its language or 
meaning. Davis v. Campbell, 61 N.W. 1053, 93 
Iowa 524.'' 
Nor has the defendant complied with Section 104-48-8 
U.C.A. 1943: 
"Any writing may be proved either: 
(1) By any one who saw the writing executed; or, 
(2) By evidence of the genuineness of the hand-
writing of the maker; or, 
(3) By a subscribing witness." 
From the foregoing it follows that the defendant 
has failed to show that the instruments under which 
she claims were effective deeds of conveyance, that they 
satisfied the State of Frauds or that they were sub-
scribed to in writing by Jennie B. Schank. To hold other-
wise would be to open the door to the vice suggested in 
the Tarpey case to the effect that when one overlooks 
the solemnity of execution it increases the danger of 
fraudulent or forged instruments. And we go further in 
stating that to permit the defendant to prevail on the 
question of due execution under the circumstances of the 
case at bar would be to open the door to proof of title 
by something short of a writing subscribed by the grantor 
and would permit parol evidence to suffice. 
3. Mrs. Schank's Conduct With Reference To The 
Property Was Testamentary in Nature. 
In approaching the proposition now under considera-
tion we do not want to be understood as conceding that 
Mrs. Schank had the conversation at Saratoga as claimed 
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by Eschler or that she, at any time, delivered the deeds 
to him. Eschler's testimony is so unnatural and his 
conduct, while alone with his wife in Mrs. Schank's 
hon1e immediately before and after the funeral, is such 
as to cast grave suspicion upon his statements. He testi-
fied in effect that his "idle curiosity" (Tr. p. 141) got 
the best of him in March, 1946, to the extent that after 
Mrs. Schank left Saratoga and returned home he broke 
the seal on the envelope and looked at the deeds (Tr. 
p. 138). But he claims that he said nothing to his wife, 
the defendant, until a year later, April 2, 1947, and 
after Mrs. Schank's death and the funeral that she, his 
wife, was the recipient of real estate worth $85,000.00 
and upwards (Tr. p. 76). If the instruments were in-
tended as absolute conveyances it is quite difficult to 
believe that Eschler would keep that information from 
his wife, and yet out of sheer curiosity violate the impli-
cation of a sealed envelope. 
Eschler was a man of moderate circumstances, strug-
gling with rehabilitation after service in the Armed 
Forces and the problems of the G. I. with a family. 
To our minds, he had t-o say that he made no disclosure 
to his wife about the deeds in ·order to account for the 
conduct and silence of both of them immediately prior 
to and immediately following the funeral. Mrs. Mayo 
testified that Mrs. Eschler was extremely anxious to 
examine the contents of the safety deposit box at the 
bank and to determine the existence of bank accounts 
in her favor or in favor of her children (Tr. pp. 278-
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279). )Ir. Eschler 's testimony was necessary to account 
for the absence of a frank statement that l\frs. Eschler 
was already the recipient of her Aunt's bounty through 
the medium of the deeds in question. The information 
in that regard was not forthcoming until after the deeds 
had been recorded, which was the first thing that the 
Eschlers did on the morning following the day of the 
funeral and after remaining alone in Mrs. Schank's 
home the previous night. The deeds were recorded 
shortly after 10 A.M. on April3, 1947. 
The safe in Mrs. Schank's home was a receptacle 
for her private papers. The safe had been opened on 
Monday afternoon and remained open while Mr. and 
Mrs. Eschler stayed alone that night in the Schank home. 
Exhibit A, the undated memorandum in the handwriting 
of Mrs. Schank set forth above, states : ''Deeds to prop-
erty are in safe to be completed as designated by my 
mother.'' It can be argued that the deeds referred to 
in the memorandum were those that Mrs. Schank signed 
in the office of the witness Dowse, and which she took 
from the office in their incompleted form. The silence 
of both :Mr. and Mrs. Eschler on the subject until after 
the deeds had been recorded, their desire to determine 
the disposition of the property up to a point and then 
their silence and inactivity is all explained by the 
proposition that the deeds were in Mrs. Schank's safe 
in her home· until after her death and from the safe 
removed by either ~Ir. or Mrs. Eschler or both of them, 
and the name of the grantee inserted after death and 
before the documents were recorded. 
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Corroborating our conception of the unreliability 
of the witness Eschler is his confession that from the 
bureau in Mrs. Schank's home and after her death he 
extracted a sheet from an account book pertaining to a 
trifling transaction between himself and Mrs. Eschler 
(Tr. p. 133-137). Mr. Eschler, an auditor, in removing 
a page of an account book involving his own personal 
account with the deceased, immediately casts suspicion 
upon himself. To hide evidence of his indebtedness is 
not consistent with the conduct of a man who in truth 
and good faith has in his possession for delivery to his 
wife deeds representing property of the value of more 
than $85,000.00. Exhibit R, the page that was removed, 
shows an indebtedness not to exceed $100.00. The answer 
is that when he took the page out of the account book 
he had not at that time run across the deeds. He could 
not give a clear story as to what he did with Exhibit 
R ( Tr. pp. 130, 134, 136). It will be argued that what we 
say here as to credibility was solely within the province 
of the trial court which determined the proposition ad-
versely, but it will not be ignored when this court deter-
mines that the legal equation comes solely from the lips 
of the witness Eschler and that the testimony and evi-
dence with reference to intent must be clearly estab-
lished by a preponderance of credible, competent evi-
dence with the burden of so doing being that of the 
defendant. 
To prevail, the defendant must show that Mrs. 
Schank intended to divest herself of title to the property 
at the time of the alleged delivery of the deeds to Eschler, 
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and that what she did was not testamentary in natur·e 
or to be the substitute of a \Vill. The defendant, having 
set forth the deeds as her affirmative defense to plain-
tiffs' action to quiet title, requires her to assume the 
burden of going forward and proving by the preponder-
anee of the evidence a good and bona fide delivery. The 
rule is stated in 20 Am. Jur. Section 137, page 142, as 
follows: 
''As to affirmative defenses asserted by the de-
fendant, he is the actor and, hence, must estab-
lish the allegations of such defenses. In other 
words, the burden of proof in the trne sense of 
the term is upon the defendant as to all affirma-
tive defenses which he sets up in answer to the 
plaintiff's claim or cause of action, upon which 
issue is joined, whether they relate to the whole 
case or only to certain issues in the case.'' 
The deeds were not delivered directly to the grantee 
but to a third party. Under those circumstances ther·e 
must be something besides the mere act of delivery to 
evidence the intent. The rule is well stated in Lewis v. 
Tinsley, 287 N.W. 507, 124 A.L.R. 45'9 (S.D.), as follows: 
''And in the case of Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 
377, the Ohio court said: 'If the deed be delivered 
to the grantee, the natural presumption is that it 
is for his use, and no words are necessary. But 
if it be handed to a stranger there is no such 
natural presumption; and hence, unless there be 
something besides the mere act of delivery to 
evidence the intent, it is impossible to say that 
the grantor designed to part with the title.' 
We believe the expressions of these three dif-
ferent courts just quoted are sound, and that the 
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reasoning therein when applied to the law as it 
exists in this state establishes substantially the 
following result. A presumption of delivery arises 
from the mere possession of the deed by the 
grantee. This presumption presupposes a delivery 
of the deed directly from the grantor to the 
grantee and is based upon the fact that it is 
natural and reasonable to presume that, when 
a grantor places a deed in the possession of the 
grantee, it is done with the intent to convey title. 
However, when it is shown that the deed came 
into the possession of the grantee through the 
hands of a third person, the reason underlying the 
presumption has vanished, and the case stands 
or falls upon the evidence presented to the court. 
So in this case, the presumption upon which re-
spondent relies, and upon which the trial court 
apparently decided this case was overcome by the 
showing that deeds were not turned over to the 
grantee by the grantor, but were delivered by 
the grantor to a third person. Without the pre-
sumption there is nothing in the facts to support 
the finding and conclusion of the trial court.'' 
In order to support defendant's claim, she must 
show an absolute delivery of the instruments, coupled 
with the intention that the grantor be div·ested of the 
title to the property at the time of delivery. The rule 
is stated in TVood v. Wood, 87 Utah 394, 49 P. (2d) 416: 
"The law with respect to gifts inter vivos was 
stated by this court in the case of Holman v. 
Deseret Savings Bank, 41 Utah, 340, 124 P. 765, 
766, as follows: 'Gifts inter vivos have no refer-
ence to the future, and go into immediate and 
absolute effect. To constitute such a gift, the 
donor must be divested of, and the donee invested 
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with, the right of property in the subject matter 
of the gift. It must be absolute, irrevocable, with-
out any reference to its taking place at some 
future period. The donor must deliver tl~Je prop-
erty, and part zrith all present and future domin-
ion O'cer it.'" (Italics ours). 
In Singleton r. K1elly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, this 
court said: 
"The law here applicable is clearly stated in 
Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1, Ann. 
Cas .. 1916E, 703, from which we quote : 
'It is well settled that a person may make a 
conveyance of property and place it in the hands 
of a third party to be delivered to the grantee 
named in it on the death of the grantor, and that 
such a delivery will be effectual to pass a present 
title to the property to the grantee, if the inten-
tion of the grantor is to make such delivery ab-
solute and place it beyond the power thereafter 
to revoke or control the deed. Where delivery is 
made under these circumstances and with this 
intention, it is fully operative and effective to vest 
a present title in the grantee, the grantor retain-
ing only a life estate in the property and the third 
party or depositary holds the deed as a trustee for 
the grantee named in it. Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 
451, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186, 33 Pac. 338; Moore v. 
Trott, 156 Cal. 353, 134 Am. St. Rep. 131, 104 Pac. 
578. 
On the other hand, it is equally well settled that 
where a deed is deposited with a third party to 
be handed to the grantee on the death of the 
grantor, unless this is accompanied by an in-
tention on the part of the grantor that title to 
the property shall thereby immediately pass to 
the grantee, there is no delivery of the deed and 
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consequently no title is transferred. If the deed 
is handed to the dAevposita;ry without any int.entiJon 
of pres.ently tramsferritng title, but, on the oon-
tr"lary, the gr:antor itn.tended Ito reserve the 1right 
'of domin~on over the deed (J!Yiid r:evolae; or reooll it, 
ther:e is no effective delive.ry of the deed 'as a 
transfer of title. So, to1o·, if it be the ilnfAention of 
the grantor when he deposvts a deed that it shall 
1only be delivered to the gnwntee by the depositary 
aftle-r the de1ath of the gnantor, 01nd that the title 
is .to vest only upon such delivery 1aft1er his de1ath, 
then the deed is entirely mo:penative as oonstitut-
img ,an attempt by the granto.r to make a testa-
mentary dispositiJon of !t'his pro1p1erty~ This may 
only be done by will executed as required by the 
law of wills of this state, and a deed, the purpose 
of which is intended to be testamentary, cannot 
be given effect'." (Italics ours). 
In Reed v. Kn1JJdson, 80 Utah 428, 15 P. (2d) 347, 
where the question of delivery was discussed, the court 
held as follows: 
''Where a delivery is thus made to a third per-
son, the question whether the gift was thereby 
completed without actual delivery to the donee 
depends entirely upon whether the person to whom 
the property is delivered receives it as the donor's 
agent or as trustee for the donee. And this is 
to be determined from the intention of the donor, 
the situation and relation of the parties, the kind 
and character of the property, and the things said 
and done in regard thereto, as disclosed by the 
evidence. If the pro1J1erty remains under the con-
trol of t:he donor, although in the keeping of the 
third pers1on, and the tatter is subject to his fur-
their direction as to its final disposition, then his 
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Telation is that of an agent. If, however, the prop-
erty is delivered by the donor with intention that 
the present title and ownership shall pass to the 
donee and such intention is carried into effect 
by the language employed and the things done 
in relation thereto, then the gift is executed and 
the third person is a trustee for the donee. 
Delivery is a matter of intent and the intent 
is to be arrived at from all the facts and circum-
stances in evidence. ~Iower v. Mower, 64 Utah 
260, 228 P. 911. The Court found, and there is evi-
dence to support it, that C. 0. Christensen was 
duly appointed administrator of the estate of 
Wesley Reed Larsen, deceased, and it may reason-
ably be inferred that Young was the attorney for 
the administrator. There can be no doubt that 
John Reed intended to give the grantee an undi-
vided one-half interest in the estate. This intent is 
shown by his acts and declarations to that effect 
both before and subsequent to the execution of the 
assignment. Intent to make a gift is not sufficient 
unless there was also delivery of the instrument. 
Although he lived seven months after the execu-
tion of the instrument and delivery thereof to 
Mr. Young, Reed made no attempt to control it 
or to withdraw it, nor did he do any act incon-
sistent with an intention to effectively pass it 
beyond his control. He delivered it to Mr. Young 
without restrictions or reservations and we .t.himk 
the inferenCie reasonably cle.ar that he did not in-
tend to reserve t~o himself any fulti"bher control 
over the instrument or the property." (Italics 
ours). 
In this case it will be noted that the court in holding 
that there was a good delivery stated: ''Although he 
lived seven months after the execution of the instrument 
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and delivery thereof to Mr. Young, Reed made no attempt 
to control it or to withdraw it, nor did he do any act 
inconsistent with an intention to effectiv,ely pass it be-
yond his control * * * he did not intend to reserve to 
himself any further control over the instrument or the 
prope1rty." By these statements it is clearly shown that 
even though Reed had made no attempt to withdraw 
the instrument if he had done other acts in the exercise 
of the actual control of the property concerned, the court 
would have considered this in determining whether at 
the time the delivery was made he actually intended it 
to be irrevocable. 
And in the case of Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 
9·4 P. (2d) 465, the court clearly supports the theory that 
the main matter to consider in determining the intent 
of a grantor at the time of a delivery, is not necessarily 
his actions and words at the time of delivery or whether 
he has tried to regain possession ·of the instrument, but 
his subsequent control ,ov·er the p.roperty itnvolved. The 
court sets forth the following facts covering the question 
·of delivery: 
"With respect to the delivery of the deed, the 
trial court excluded evidence offered by the de-
fendant as to the formal act of delivery as being 
incompetent under the provisions of Section 104-
49-2, R.S.U. 1933. However, she was permitted 
to testify that she first saw the deed on May 19, 
1906, in the testator's hands and next saw it in 
her own hands after which she immediately placed 
it in a tin box; that when she first saw the deed 
the testator was removing it from his pocket, re-
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marking that he had a present for her, and handed 
it to her, and that she paid him a dollar, request-
ing howeYer, that the deed bte not recorded wrdil 
after his death, and that there,after it remained in 
her possession.'' (Italics ours). 
From these facts it is clearly shown that at the time 
the delivery was made the donor stated that he was 
making a gift, handed the deed to the donee and that 
the same remained in her possession thereafter. The 
court, however, in ruling on the matter affirmed the 
lower court in its finding that there was no delivery and 
held as follows: 
''This testimony would undoubtedly justify an 
inference that the deed was delivered and should 
be considered prima facie sufficient for that pur-
pose. The inference is not conclusive, nor would 
the presumption arising from the possession of 
the deed by the defendant be conclusive. 
Was the behavior of the testator and of the 
defendant subsequent to their separation incon-
sistent with the claim that the deed was delivered 
with intent to presently pass title 1 It is apparent 
that the testator thereafter exercised ail of the 
indicia of ownership by entering into the exclu-
sive possession of the premises, taking insurance 
in his own name, redeeming the property from a 
tax sale, mortgaging the property with the knowl-
edge of the defendant, disposing of the property 
by will, collecting rents, paying taxes and assum-
ing all expenses of upkeep, all without any pro-
test or objection or claim by or on behalf of the 
defendant. In the course of these various trans-
Hctions he had repeatedly stated and represented 
that he was the owner of the property, such state-
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ments, however, being admissible only upon the 
question of intent to presently pass title, if in fact 
there had been a manua~ delivery. 
'Since delivery is essentially a matter of intent, 
which intent is to be arrived at from all the facts 
and surrounding circumstances, we believe the 
better rule is to include in those facts and cir-
cumstances declarations of the grantor both be-
fore and after the date of the deed, at least where 
it appears that the declarations are made fairly 
and in the ordinary course of life'. Mower v. 
Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911, 914." 
We cannot see the necessity of setting forth num,er-
ous authorities from other jurisdictions to support this 
contention as we feel that this court has clearly estab-
lished the doctrine. However, we call the court's atten-
tion to the recent Washington case of Puckett v. Pucke:t't, 
185 P. (2d) 132. The court at page 133 held as follows: 
''The story of Nelson Puckett, that sometime 
between Labor Day and September 25, 1939, his 
brother handed him this deed, he deposited it at 
606 Pine, and later, but prior to September 25th, 
his brother repossessed it, seems to us to be high-
ly improbable. In fact, it is utterly fantastic. Let 
us examine the record further and see whether 
we can find, from the conduct of both brothers, 
any facts to indicate such . a de'livery. Nelson 
never mentioned the deed to his son, to the doc-
tor's wife, or to anyone else. He never put it on 
record (Until after discovering it in his brother's 
office). He never paid the taxes on it. He never 
took any produce off of it. On the other hand, the 
doctor continued to pay the taxes. He planted 
the fruit trees on it, and took the produce there-
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from. He bought material for the place. He treated 
it as his property, and intended to go there when 
he retired. He was working there the day he fell 
and was injured, which injuries resulted in his 
death. On .. A.pril 27, 1935, two years after the date 
of the deed to his brother, he filed a declaration of 
homestead on the place. We find nothing in the 
conduct of Nelson Puckett which would indicate 
a taking of domimiJon and control over the prop'" 
erty, and we find nothing in the oonduct of the 
doctor which would imdioat.e amy tp~rtJ.ing with 
such dominion and oowtfnol. '' (Italics ours). 
If the only thing that was necessary in these cases 
was to show the handing of the deed to the third party 
or grantee and a statement that the grantor wanted the 
donee to have the property or the fact that the grantor 
had never during his or her lifetime requested the return 
of the deed, then why would any evidence of the sub-
sequent acts of the grantor, such as expressions of own-
ership, the payment of taxes, or the collection of rents, 
etc. be admissible~ 
Inconsistent with the required intent to divest her-
self of title, nirs. Schank did not part with the abstracts 
(Tr. p. 131), accepted payments on a contract of sale 
enter·ed into by her in 1944 involving the ninth tract of 
land set forth in the complaint, collected rentals, kept 
meticulous accounting records with ref.erence to the same, 
made capital expenditures by way of repairs and im-
provements, paid the taxes, insurance, upkeep, expressed 
a willingness to sell for a price, made returns and pay-
ment of income tax, retained possession and enclosed 
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the deeds in a sealed envelope. To the witness Wallace 
in the middle of September, 1946, she stated that she 
was not interested in $30,000.00 for one of the tracts 
because she would have to pay a large tax but that she 
would sell for $37,500.00 ('Tr. p. 269), and this was 
before a visit to Mr. Wallace's office made for the pur-
pose of determining how he was getting along with the 
sale of her property (Tr. p. 270). To the witness Moffat 
she stated that she owned the vacant lot on the southeast 
corner of 46th South and State Stre·et, and discussed a 
proposition of le'asing the same (Tr. p. 285). To the 
witness Smith she expressed her concern over taxes if 
she should dispose of the property (Tr. p. 266). These 
witnesses all testified to transactions with Mrs. Schank 
after the purported delivery by her to Eschler of the 
deeds in question. 
Mrs. Schank's eonduct with reference to the property 
and the statements that she made to her friends and 
neighbors are inconsistent with the idea of having al-
ready, through her negotiation with Eschler, divested 
hers·elf of title and future interest in the property. Her 
acts, statem·ents and conduct at the most are consistent 
with a testamentary desire or wish that Mrs. Eschler 
be made the recipient of the properties. While it might 
he said that Mrs. Schank's disposition to give the prop-
erties to Mrs. Eschler at some future date and probably 
after death is quite well reflected in the record, never-
theless the record does not disclose the proof of intent 
to presently divest herself of her properties to the exclu-
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sion of any future or further dominion or control over 
the san1e. All that can be said for defendant's position 
is that the wish or desire expressed by l\lrs. Schank was 
never in a legal fashion carried out or consummated. 
The conduct of :Jlrs. Schank is inherently opposed to 
the testimony of the ''itness Eschler and his t,estimony 
as to the transactions with the deceased brings us to the 
next point involved. 
4. The Witness Eschler Was Incompetent To Testify 
To Transactions With The Deceased. 
Subdivision (3) of Section 104-49-2 U.C.A. 1943 pro-
vides: 
''The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
(3} A party to any civi'l action, suit or pro-
ceeding, and any person directly interested in the 
event thereof, and any person from, through or 
under whom such party or interested person de-
rives his interest or title or any part thereof, when 
the adverse party in such action, suit or proceed-
ing claims or opposes, sues or defends, as 
guardian of an insane or incompetent person, or 
as the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or 
devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian, as-
signee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such 
heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by, or 
transaction with, such deceased, insane or in-
competent person, or matter of fact whatever, 
which must have been equally within the knowl-
edge of both the witness and such insane, incom-
petent or deceased person, unless such witness is 
called to testify thereto by such adverse party 
so claiming or opposing, suing or defending, in 
such action, suit or proceeding.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
The competency of the witness Eschler to testify 
was objected to on the ground of the above statute and 
on the further ground that his testimony would be in 
violation of the Statute of Frauds (Tr. pp. 125-127). That 
Eschler is "directly interested in the event" of the 
action is evidenced by his own testimony found at Tran-
script page 129. The witness stated: 
"I recall she said she wanted Leta to have the 
security of those properties at all times, and she 
stated that she didn't want us to-that is, she 
advised against our seUing any of them im-
mediately, that she thought the security lay in 
our retention of them and it was for that reason 
that she suggested that she pay the taxes, inas-
much as my income would not support my family 
and support additional costs on these properties." 
The purport of the testimony is carried into the find-
ings of fact, particularly finding number 5 (Tr. p. 52) 
where it is found that ''said J·ennie B. Schank further 
expressed the desire that she continue the payment of 
tax·es and expenses incident to the management of the 
property described in said deeds in order that the ex-
penses incident to their operation and management 
should not be burdensome to defendant or her husband, 
Logan Russell Eschler.'' 
In Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911, this 
court held that the mere relationship of husband and 
wife does not make the husband such an interested party 
in the event of a suit as to preclude hl'm frrJm testifying 
in favor of his wife, but in the case at bar the interest 
is beyond that of the relationship. 
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The disqualifying interest was defined in the case of 
In re ran Alstine's Estate, 26 Utah 193, 72 P. 942, as 
follows: 
''By the express terms of said subdivision, the 
disqualification of persons as witnesses on the 
ground of interest is limited to such as have a 
direct interest in the event of the 'civil action, 
suit, or proceeding.' Unless, therefore, Mrs. Van 
Alstine has such an interest, she was not dis-
qualified as a witness. To be directly interested 
is the same thing as having a direct interest. A 
direct interest is the opposite of an indirect in-
terest, and excludes the idea of contingency. A 
direct interest is defined in Winfield's Words 
and Phrases, p. 195, as follows : 'A direct interest 
is one which is certain, and not contingent or 
doubtful.' In Black's Law Dictionary it is defined 
as follows : 'A direct interest, such as would 
render the interested party incompetent to testify 
in regard to the matter, is an interest which is 
certain and not contingent or doubtful'." 
The purpose of the statute is stated in Miller v. 
Livingstone, 31 Utah 415, 88 P. 338, as follows: 
"The statute in this regard is intended to pro-
tect the estates of deceased persons from as-
saults, 'and relates to proceedings wherein the 
decision sought by the party so testifying would 
tend to reduce or impair the estate, and does not 
relate to the relative rights of the heirs or de-
visees as to the distribution of .an estate in a pro-
ceeding by which the estate itself is in no event to 
be reduced or impaired'.'' 
In JJfaxfield v. Sailnsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P. (2d) 
122, the court held that "It is the inter·est in the claim 
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which is adverse-not the adv·erse testimony that dis-
qualifies him", and again "the interest of the witness 
must be in the claim urged adversely to the estate.'' 
Eschler, as the head of the family unit, was the one 
upon whom the cost of maintaining the properties would 
fall as his testimony recognizes and, therefore, he is 
directly interested in the transaction testified to. The 
effect of his testimony would be to diminish the estate 
of the deceased thus, under the authorities above men-
tioned, making him incompetent as a witness to any 
matter of fact whatever which must have been equally 
within his knowledge and the knowledge of the deceased. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing arguments cover all of the assign-
ments of error and disclose, we believe, a situation where 
the motive to fabricate cannot be overlooked. The testi-
mony of the witness Eschler in the attempt to show a 
valid delivery is not only unworthy of belief but is incon-
sistent with the conduct of Mrs. Schank, both before and 
after the alleged delivery. Mrs. Schank was certainly 
careful enough in her business transactions not to have 
conveyed by warranty deed property which was already 
under contract to be sold to third parties (the Springer 
transaction). Mrs. Schank had a purpose in not parting 
with the abstracts of title because with the abstracts of 
title she could deal with the properties as against unre-
corded deeds. Her account with Eschler, the evidence of 
which he attempted to hide, shows her disposition to 
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require him to account for small items and transactions, 
inconsistent with the thought that the witness expressed 
when he said that :Mrs. Schank did not want to burden 
him with the cost of maintaining the properties. Mrs. 
Schank was tax conscious. As the abstracts disclose her 
titles in the main came from her deceased husband by 
deeds recorded after his death. (Mr. Schank died in 
1937 Tr. p. 112). The memorandum, exhibit A, discloses 
the same disposition of avoiding, if possible, inheritance 
and gift taxes on her estate. Mrs. Schank at all times 
held herself out to be the owner of the properties, 
occupying one piece as a home at the time of her death 
and collecting and making income tax returns from the 
rents and profits of others. Transactions of this nature 
should be closely screened, and the circumstances of 
each case should be closely scrutinized to determine the 
intent of the alleged donor where a gift is claimed. 
Gifts of real property can openly and lawfully be 
made, and where a gift is intended there is no reason 
why the record of the donor should not be just as com-
plete and just as unequivocal as when a conveyance for 
consideration is made. The same formality of execution 
and subscribing should be required. The conduct of Mrs. 
~chank fell short of a gift and at the most disclos·es a 
testamentary desire never fulfilled or consummated in 
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legal contemplation. The judgment and decree of the 
trial court should be rev-ersed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN & RICHARDS 
M. EARL MARSHALL 
BRENT T. LYNCH, JR. 
Attorneys jo 1r Plaitntiffs 
and A WJ.!ellants 
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